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Abstract 
We investigate how firms react to their peers’ adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by 
using a regression discontinuity design that relies on ―locally‖ exogenous variations of CSR generated 
by shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. We find that peers of a voting 
firm which passes a close-call CSR proposal experience lower announcement returns and higher 
following-year CSR scores than those of a voting firm that marginally rejects. Such effects are stronger 
in peer firms with higher competitive pressure and a more transparent information environment, and 
vary across peer firms with different financial constraints.  
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has increasingly become a mainstream business activity—
ranging from voluntarily engaging in environmental protection to increasing workforce diversity and 
employee welfare—although standard economic theories predict that it should be rather uncommon 
(Benabou and Tirole (2010), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012)). The neoclassical economic paradigm 
usually considers CSR as unnecessary and inconsistent with profit maximization (e.g., Friedman 
(1970)). This discrepancy between theory and real-world observations has attracted much scholarly 
attention in recent years. One popular view on why CSR prevails is that it creates a competitive 
advantage for the firm, such as enhanced social capital that may lead to higher profitability and sales 
growth (Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2015)), thus contributes to firm value. Following this line, 
numerous studies have investigated the strategic value implications of CSR by focusing on how the 
adoption of CSR leads to higher returns and lower risks (e.g., Deng, Kang, and Low (2013), Flammer 
(2015), Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen (2014)). Others study the causes of CSR, and attribute the 
level of CSR to a firm’s financial and operational performance (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman 
(2012)).  
While shedding light on the relationship between CSR and firm performance, the extant studies 
are largely silent on how CSR interacts with the firm’s surrounding environment, such as influencing 
industry structure and product market competition. Notably, firms do not operate in isolation, and they 
often compete with other firms in the product market. If CSR creates a competitive advantage, its 
effect should be mostly manifested through a firm’s competition with other firms. To the extent that 
CSR signifies a firm’s influence on the society in general and its product quality in particular, one can 
reasonably expect that it can affect other peer firms’ competitive position and CSR practice as well. 
For instance, when a firm adopts a green technology in its production, it may be perceived as a threat 
to its peer firms, because such green technology may attract more environmentally conscious 
customers to switch from these peer firms to the adopting firm. Investors of these peer firms are aware 
of the potential loss of their companies’ market shares, leading to immediate negative market reactions 
of these companies. To catch up with their competitor and regain their competitive edge, these peer 
firms may then adopt similar technologies in the next period. In this study, we build on this 
competitive advantage perspective of CSR and formally examine whether and how a firm’s adoption 
of CSR can affect the CSR practice and value of its peer firms. 
Properly addressing these questions is difficult, as both CSR and a firm’s competitive position 
in the market are arguably endogenous choices of the firm. This posits an empirical challenge as to 
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whether firms and investors react to their peers’ CSR actions by changing their firm’s CSR practice 
and market valuations, or whether the pre-existing differences in other unobservable firm 
characteristics lead different firms to adopt different levels of CSR. It is also challenging to apply a 
typical quasi-natural experiment approach by exploring exogenous legislative changes, because such 
legislative changes usually affect the CSR of all firms in the same industry or market. Moreover, the 
traditional definition of peer firms based on industry classifications such as the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) may not 
properly capture a true peer group—which may span multiple industries with regard to CSR practice—
as most CSR issues are not industry-specific and can affect a broad range of stakeholders (such as 
environmental protection and product quality). As a result, the existing literature generally falls short 
in providing causal estimates of the peer effects of CSR.  
In this study, we circumvent these empirical concerns and investigate the product market peer 
effects of CSR by using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach. More specifically, we 
compare the effects of a firm’s shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals that pass or fail by a small 
margin of votes (around the 50% majority threshold) in annual meetings on its peer firms’ stock 
returns and subsequent CSR practice. The passage of such close-call proposals is akin to randomly 
―assigning‖ CSR to companies and hence not correlated with peer firms’ characteristics. Conceptually, 
there is no reason to expect that peer firms of a company for which a CSR proposal passes with 50.1% 
of the votes are systematically different from peer firms of a company for which a similar proposal 
fails with 49.9% of the votes, keeping everything else constant. Therefore, close-call CSR proposals 
provide a source of random variation of a firm’s CSR that can be used to estimate the causal effect of 
CSR on peer firms’ market valuation and CSR practice.1 Although a similar approach has been used by 
Flammer (2015) and by Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) to study the effects of the adoption of CSR 
proposals and of corporate governance proposals on stock returns, both studies examined the focal 
firm’s shareholder value rather than peer effects induced by market competition. Our empirical setting 
                                                          
1
 Appendix A shows two examples of voting on CSR proposals which help illustrate our empirical method. The 
example in Panel A is a case of a marginally rejected CSR proposal during the shareholder meeting of Massey 
Company on May 19, 2010. The proposal on carbon dioxide emissions was rejected with 45.6% supporting votes. 
The example in Panel B is a case of a marginally approved CSR proposal during the shareholder meeting of 
IDACORP, Inc on May 21, 2010. The proposal on reducing total greenhouse gas emissions was passed with 51.2% 
supporting votes. Our objective is to examine the difference in non-voting peer firms’ reaction. In our sample Massey 
Energy Company has 49 peer firms, with an average 3-day CAR of 0.0137 and an average adjusted KLD score of -
0.62 in the year after the vote, i.e. 2010. IDACORP, Inc. has 55 peers, with an average 3-day CAR of -0.0068 and an 
average adjusted KLD score of -0.20. We analyze the peer effects of CSR by comparing the difference in peer firms’ 
market reaction (i.e., -0.0068 v.s. 0.0137) in peer firms’ future CSR performance (i.e., -0.20 v.s. -0.62). 
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focusing on peer firms enables us to go beyond the focal firm’s perspective and study the dynamic 
interaction among firms, which captures the competitive nature of CSR that is largely unexplored in 
the literature. 
The two pillars of our empirical analyses are the measurement of CSR and the identification of 
peer groups. First, we measure CSR using the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) scores, which 
are the most comprehensive and standard CSR scores in the literature (e.g., Chatterji et al. (2009), 
Hong and Liskovich (2014), Flammer (2014, 2015)). KLD scores are developed by a for-profit 
company and similar to credit ratings. The scores measure firm-level CSR along the lines of 
community relations, product characteristics, environmental impact, employee relations, workforce 
diversity, and corporate governance. KLD scans public databases such as those with employee strikes 
and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violations, and uses a team of analysts to measure these 
and other social responsibility dimensions of firm production. Second, we construct our sample of peer 
firms using the Hoberg-Phillips industry classification based on firm pairwise similarity scores from 
textual analyses of firm 10-K product descriptions. This method constructs a peer firm group based on 
the relatedness of firms in the product market space and can measure both within and across industry 
similarity. In contrast, the standard industry classifications such as the SIC and the NAICS are not 
defined according to a corresponding spatial representation or a continuous representation of the 
pairwise similarity of any two firms and thus their identifications of peer firms do not properly reflect 
their competitive nature—that is, the similarity of their products.   
By empirically testing a large sample of 3,452 U.S. public non-voting ―peer‖ firms over the 
period of 1997–2011 using the RDD approach, we find strong effects of the passage of close-call CSR 
proposals on peer firms’ shareholder value and subsequent CSR adoption. More specifically, on the 
days close to and right after the shareholder meeting, the passage of a firm’s CSR proposal by a narrow 
margin of votes yields a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of its non-voting peer firms that 
is 0.6% to 1% lower than the peers of the voting firm whose similar CSR proposal fails marginally. In 
addition, if the voting firm marginally passes a closed-call CSR proposal, the average CSR score for its 
non-voting peer firms in the following year is 0.16 points higher than that of the non-voting peer firms 
in which the vote marginally fails. This difference is economically significant as it is about 30% of the 
standard deviation of the adjusted CSR score. These results are robust when using global polynomial 
estimations, different measures of CSR and their sub-scores, as well as different peer samples (i.e., 
peer samples that are randomly drawn or based on SIC 3-digit industry classification). Such effects are 
absent in non-peer groups and for non-CSR proposals. In addition, peer firms tend to catch up by 
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voluntarily engaging in CSR initiatives (rather than reducing CSR concerns), and in the same domain 
in which their competing voting firm passes the specific type of CSR proposal.                                                        
We further explore a few channels through which such CSR-peer effects take place. First, we 
investigate the role of competitive relation between the voting firm and its peers. We find that the 
aforementioned peer effects are stronger in firms with higher competitive pressure as measured by the 
similarity of the products between a voting firm and its non-voting peers, and when the peer firm has a 
higher CSR score than its associated voting firm in the year prior to the vote. Second, we investigate 
whether peer firms’ capability in catching up in CSR performance is limited by their financial 
constraints and how this is reflected in the reaction of their investors. We find that peers with more 
severe financial constraints experience more negative abnormal returns and less CSR adoption 
following the passage of the voting firm’s CSR proposal. Third, we investigate the role of information 
transparency in transmitting CSR peer effects, and find that the differences in CARs and following-
year CSR are larger in peer firms with more transparent information environment as proxied by analyst 
coverage and firm size.  
Notably, our findings may be explained by an agency-based argument of CSR, that CSR is 
costly and is a deviation from firm value maximization. Specifically, investors of peer firms expect 
that there will be a spillover effect of the costly CSR adoption and thus respond unfavorably, which 
may account for the lower announcement CARs of their firms. We address this concern in a sample of 
strategic alliances for which the relationship between peers is now collaborating rather than competing. 
The agency-based argument would predict similar effects in both types of relationship. Our empirical 
findings show that strategic alliance partners of the voting firm that marginally passes a CSR proposal 
experience higher stock market returns and a higher KLD score in the following year than alliance 
partners of the voting firm in which a CSR proposal is marginally rejected, which does not support the 
agency-based argument.  
Two guideposts can be used to put our findings into the context of the literature. First, our work 
echoes the recent academic attention on peer effects in corporate behavior and financial performance. 
The extant literature has discovered substantial peer effects on corporate behavior such as firms 
reacting to their peers’ financial policies by adjusting their capital structure (Leary and Roberts (2014)) 
and reducing cash holdings and capital expenditure while increasing dividend payout and adopting 
more anti-takeover devices following hostile takeover threats in their industry (Servaes and Tamayo 
(2014)). Other studies focus on firms’ stock price reactions to the news announcements of their peers 
such as earnings restatement (Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008)), bankruptcy attempt (Lang and 
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Stulz (1992)), success of IPOs (Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010)), and regulatory actions (Hadlock and 
Sonti (2012)). As an increasingly important aspect of corporate behavior, CSR that has been 
documented to be closely related to financial performance provides us an ideal foundation to test a 
different facet of peer effects. Our study combines the effects on both firm behavior and financial 
performance by investigating peer firms’ CSR adoption and abnormal returns following the passage of 
shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals, thus providing a more comprehensive evaluation of peer effects 
in the competitive product market.  
Second, our work contributes to the understanding of the determinants and consequences of 
CSR. On the determinants of CSR, the literature mostly focuses on a firm’s own financial motives (e.g., 
Hong et al. (2012), Jo and Harjoto (2012)), trade liberalization (Flammer (2014)), and institutional 
environment (e.g., Liang and Renneboog (2014)). Our work extends the scope of this literature by 
focusing on the dynamic nature of CSR and empirically documenting that a firm’s CSR policy can also 
be substantially changed by its peers’ CSR practice. On the consequences of CSR, the literature has 
shown that it can contribute to the focal firm’s stock return, long-term operating performance 
(Flammer (2015)), acquirer return and post-merger performance (Deng, Kang, and Low (2013)), 
reduction of costs of capital (e.g., Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2011)) and 
improvement of employee productivity (Flammer (2014)). Our study further documents that a firm’s 
CSR adoption can also influence its peer firms’ stock returns, thus extends the understanding of the 
scope of the CSR effect, namely, CSR not only influences focal firms’ financial performance, but also 
the performance of other firms.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on CSR and on peer 
effects in corporate finance. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology and Section 4 presents the 
main results of CSR peer effects. Section 5 explores a few potential channels of the CSR peer effects 
and Section 6 presents an extension by studying the CSR peer effects on alliance partners. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Corporate Social Responsibility and Peer Effects 
2.1. Corporate social responsibility 
The desirability of firms engaging in corporate social responsibility has long been recognized and 
discussed. Many researchers and practitioners consider CSR a way of obtaining competitive advantage 
such that a firm can increase their ―social capital‖ by being actively involved in activities that help to 
build good relationships with its key stakeholders (e.g., Edmans (2011), Deng et al. (2013), Flammer 
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(2015)). Others consider CSR as a way of signaling product market quality and generating a good 
corporate image that makes investors and consumers more attached to the company (Hong and 
Liskovich (2014)). CSR is also frequently regarded as delegated giving, whereby firms are well 
positioned to deliver warm-glow feelings to stakeholders who are then willing to direct their money to 
more socially responsible firms by purchasing their products and holding their stocks (e.g., Benabou 
and Tirole (2010)). All of these arguments suggest that CSR can contribute to the maximization of firm 
value. Voluminous studies have documented that on average, a higher CSR score is associated with 
higher profitability and sales growth (Lins et al. (2015)), higher firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q for 
firms in controversial industries (Cai, Jo, and Pan (2012), lower idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Lee and Faff 
(2009)), a lower probability of financial distress (e.g., Goss (2009)), a lower cost of capital ((El Ghoul 
et al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen (2014)), more positive sell-
side analysts’ recommendations (e.g., Bushee and Noe (2000)), and higher abnormal returns and long-
term post-acquisition returns (e.g., Flammer (2015), Deng et al. (2013)).  
The opposite view questioning the desirability of CSR also exists. The opponents of CSR 
usually consider it as being induced by managerial agency problems, as managers do ―good‖ with 
other people’s money. In particular, managers may pursue private benefits by engaging in costly but 
value-destroying CSR projects (e.g, Cheng et al. (2014), Masulis and Reza (2015)). Following this line, 
some studies have documented that firm participation in certain social issues—such as not engaging in 
―sin‖ industries, avoiding nuclear energy, and charity giving—is negatively associated with 
shareholder returns (e.g., Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006), Brammer and Millington (2008), Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky (2014), Masulis and Reza (2015)).  
Arguably, CSR can be both strategically valuable and a symptom of managerial agency 
problems (which can be value-destroying) (Krueger (2015)). Our empirical results that non-voting, 
product market peers on average experience a lower three-day CAR and a higher subsequent CSR 
score if the voting firm marginally passes a CSR proposal tend to support the competitive advantage 
argument of CSR. In particular, the strategic value of the exogenously increased CSR in voting firms 
threatens the non-voting peers, causes a lower stock market return, and leads the non-voting firms to 
engage in CSR activities to maintain their competitive position. Perhaps more importantly, the effects 
are stronger when the competition is higher and when information about non-voting firms is more 
transparent, which lends further support to the argument that CSR on average has strategic value and is 
unlikely to be driven by agency problems. Therefore, studying the dynamic interactions between peer 
firms, CSR, and shareholder value can shed light on the value implications of CSR. In the next section, 
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we review the growing body of literature of peer effects in finance and discuss in further detail how the 
value implications of CSR can be studied in a peer context. 
 
2.2. Peer effects 
The existence of peer effects on individual and households’ financial decision making and behavior 
has long been documented (e.g., Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012); Georgarakos, Haliassos, and Pasini 
(2014)). Recent studies have established that substantial externalities and peer effects also exist in 
corporate policies. Peer effects are believed to be one of the most important determinants of corporate 
behavior, as firms increasingly interact with other firms within the same industry and across different 
industries in their daily operations. For example, according to Leary and Roberts (2014), peer effects 
are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. 
Such peer effects are also found in corporate precautionary cash holdings (e.g., Hoberg et al. (2014)), 
corporate investment decisions (e.g., Foucault and Fresard (2014)), and financial misconduct (e.g., 
Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2014), Kaustia and Rantala (2015)). In addition, one type of behavior 
of a firm may trigger other types of behaviors and related financial policies of its peer firms, and such 
effects can subsequently be reflected in peer firms’ stock returns. For example, Servaes and Tamayo 
(2014) find that following a firm’s hostile takeover attempt, its industry peers cut their capital spending, 
free cash flows, and cash holdings while increasing their leverage and payouts and adopting more 
takeover defenses. Peer firms’ stock returns and performance also improve after a takeover attempt. 
Similarly, Hsu et al. (2010) find that the successful IPO of a company triggers negative stock price 
reactions of its peer firms, whereas a withdrawal is associated with peers’ positive stock price reactions. 
While most of these studies investigate the peer effects on a firm’s financial performance, little 
is known about such implications on a firm’s social performance. Given the voluminous evidence on 
peer effects of various corporate policies, it is reasonable to expect that CSR as an important corporate 
policy aimed at addressing various stakeholders’ issues that are often commonly shared by the local 
community, the industry, and even the country, should also be subject to peer effects. Combining the 
literature of CSR and peer effects, we argue that the peer effects of CSR can function through both 
influencing peer firms’ stock returns and CSR policies. From the perspective of competition, when a 
firm observes a commitment in CSR by its competitor, the threat of losing the competitive position in 
the product market appears, and its relative value decreases. In response, the firm will increase its 
engagement in CSR to be more competitive.  
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Following this line of competition logic, our paper fills the gap in the peer effects of corporate 
social performance by investigating how firms react to the adoption of CSR their product market 
competitors. The traditional industry classification or geographical proximity, which has been used in 
the previous literature as identification for peer firms, may not properly capture the extent to which 
firms compete, a context that we study in this paper. Recently, Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2014, 2015) 
and Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) take a step further and develop a measure of peer firms 
based on a firm pairwise similarity from a text analysis of firms’ 10-K product descriptions to study 
peer effects and product market competition. The authors’ measure of peer firms is shown to be highly 
relevant and consistent in the contexts of mergers and acquisitions, stock market valuations, operating 
cash flows, payout policies, R&Ds and advertising activities induced by a competitive threat in the 
product market. This measurement captures how managers identify rivals as their peer firms based on 
product similarity/differentiation, how various effects spill over to peers, and how peer financial 
returns are affected (Hoberg and Phillips (2015)). Therefore, it arguably can better capture the 
competitive nature of CSR. In the next section, we utilize the classification of product market peers as 
constructed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and empirically test these hypotheses regarding the net 
effects of CSR on peer firms’ stock market reactions and subsequent CSR policies.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy   
3.1. Data, measure, and sample construction 
As mentioned above, our key identification strategy is to investigate the effect of the passage of a 
firm’s close-call CSR proposal over the shareholder meeting on its non-voting peers’ CARs and 
subsequent CSR performance. We obtain the data on shareholder-proposal voting results from 
RiskMetrics and Factset’s SharkRepellent. The RiskMetrics data cover shareholder proposals from 
1997 to 2011 for all S&P 1,500 companies and additional 400–500 widely held companies. The 
resolution type ―SRI‖ in RiskMetrics identifies the proposals related to CSR. For each proposal, the 
data set provides the date of the annual meeting, the proposal’s sponsor, the voting requirements, and 
the vote outcome. We complement the voting data from RiskMetrics with data from SharkRepellent, 
which covers about 4,000 companies in the Russell 3,000 index from 2005 to 2011. In SharkRepellent, 
proposals related to CSR are categorized as ―Social/Environmental Issues.‖ 
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Our peer firm data set is retrieved from the Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2014) text-based product 
market peer database (Text-Based Network Industry Classifications or TNIC).
2
 This peer (product 
market rivals) database covers the fiscal years 1996–2011. In each fiscal year, two firms are recorded 
as a pair of rivals if they exhibit a degree of product similarity above a threshold level: ―The firm-by-
firm pairwise similarity scores are calculated by parsing the product descriptions from the firm 10-Ks 
and forming word vectors for each firm to compute continuous measures of product similarity for 
every pair of firms in our sample in each year (a pairwise similarity matrix). This is done using the 
cosine similarity method, which is applied after eliminating common words. For any two firms i and j, 
there is a product similarity, which is a real number in the interval [0, 1] describing how similar the 
words used by firms i and j are.‖ 3 This approach has the advantage of directly and dynamically 
capturing two firms’ competitive relationship in the product market.  
After linking the shareholder proposal data with the Hoberg-Philipps peer firm database and 
requiring no missing outcome variables (discussed in the following paragraph) or relevant firm 
fundamental variables (size, market-to-book, and leverage), we remove peer firms which experienced 
stock and bond issuance, M&A announcement, and dividend payments around their affiliated voting 
firm’s voting date (Day -5 to Day 5) so as to rule out potential confounding effects.4 After filtering, we 
obtain 38,630 (non-voting peer) firm-vote observations, which account for 3,452 unique non-voting 
U.S. public firms as our peer firm sample. Our sample consists of 1,407 unique firm-votes from 1997 
to 2011. Table 1 provides the distribution of our sample, with Panel A showing a summary of the 
numbers of voting firm-vote observations and non-voting peer-vote observations in each year,
5
 as well 
as the cumulative percentage, and Panel B showing the distribution of CSR proposals by type, which 
are classified according to the general categories (dimensions) as used in KLD.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
To test the response of non-voting peer firms to the voting results of the CSR proposals, we 
investigate both the stock market reaction and subsequent year CSR performance. We calculate the 
CAR over the three-day event window [-1, +1] to measure the stock market reaction. Using the CAR is 
                                                          
2
 The text-based product market peer data can be obtained from http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata/ 
3
 See more detailed definition at: http://alex2.umd.edu/industrydata/idata/readme_tnic3.txt  
4
  Our stock and bond issuance data comes from SDC database. The M&A announcement data are obtained from 
Zephyr and SDC databases. Dividend payment data are obtained from CRSP.  
5
 The jump in number of peer-vote observations from 2002 (1,330) to 2003 (2,980) is due to the change in coverage 
in the KLD database. The KLD database covers 1,128 unique firms in 2002 and 2,978 unique firms in 2003. 
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appealing because it shows how investors of non-voting firms react to the increased CSR performance 
in their peer firms. We estimate the CAR using a market model, and also validate the results based on 
the market model by estimations using the Fama-French three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor 
models.  
To test non-voting firms’ strategic reaction to the passage of a CSR proposal in their peer firm, 
we mainly rely on the CSR score of the non-voting firms in year t+1 (the year after their peer’ vote) as 
the outcome variable. The data for the CSR score construction is retrieved from the KLD database, 
which provides detailed information on firms’ CSR activities according to 13 categories: community, 
diversity, employment, environment, human rights, product, alcohol, gaming, firearms, military, 
nuclear, tobacco, and corporate governance. Within each category, the database shows whether the 
firm has conducted a good deed (―Strength‖) or a harm (―Concern‖), and gives one point to either 
strength or concern for each relevant activity of the firm. The CSR score is calculated as strengths 
minus concerns. To measure the overall CSR performance of a firm, we consider four main categories 
(or dimensions) of CSR as classified by KLD: community, diversity, employee relationship, and 
environment.
6
 Following Deng et al. (2013) and Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we count the number of 
strengths and concerns within each of the four categories and subtract the number of concerns from the 
number of strengths to construct the raw score for each category in each year. The overall raw CSR 
score is the sum of the raw scores of the four categories. A higher raw CSR score indicates a better 
CSR performance. However, as pointed out by Mǎnescu (2011), the raw CSR score may be 
problematic for evaluating a firm’s actual CSR activities over years as the number of strengths and 
concerns within each category can differ across years. To overcome this concern and make consistent 
comparisons in both the cross-sectional and time-series analyses, we scale the strengths and concerns 
for each firm-year to a range of 0 to 1. To do so, we divide the number of strengths (or concerns) for 
each firm-year within each CSR category by the maximum possible number of strengths (or concerns) 
in each CSR category each year to get the adjusted strength (or concern) index. We then subtract the 
adjusted concern index from the adjusted strength index. For each category, the adjusted CSR score 
ranges from -1 to +1. For the overall adjusted CSR score, we sum the four adjusted scores. Therefore 
in principle, the adjusted CSR score can range from -4 to +4. We use the raw CSR score and the 
change in the adjusted CSR performance score as alternative outcome variables for a robustness check.  
                                                          
6
 We exclude corporate governance from our CSR performance construction, as it is perceived as a mechanism to 
mitigate conflicts between principles and managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) rather than a concern about other 
stakeholders, such as the community and employees. We also exclude the product safety and quality dimension, as it 
is more likely to be subject to legal restrictions and regulations. 
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In addition to these alternative measures of CSR, we also test the robustness of our study using 
alternative samples, including different definitions of peers and randomly drawn peer groups. 
Moreover, to investigate potential mechanisms through which CSR adoption can influence peer firms’ 
stock returns and future CSR strategies, we conduct several subsample analyses by focusing on 
different levels of financial constraints and information asymmetry. Furthermore, as an extension to 
our story of CSR-peer effects, we test the spillover effect of CSR adoption on the CSR performance of 
alliances (including joint ventures), for which we obtain data from Zephyr and SDC.
7
  
The definitions and sources of our variables are provided in the Appendix B. The summary 
statistics of our key outcome variables and control variables are provided in Table 2.  
 




We use a regression discontinuity framework to estimate the causal effect of shareholder proposals on 
peer firms’ shareholder returns and other outcome variables.8 Similar to Flammer (2015), we use CSR 
proposals, but focus on the shareholder returns and other outcomes of the non-voting peer firms instead 
of the voting firms. Ideally, to obtain a consistent estimate, we would want the passage of a CSR 
proposal to be a randomly assigned variable with regard to peer firms’ characteristics, especially in 
regards to their CSR performance. The RDD framework that exploits the vote shares helps us to 
approximate this ideal setup, because the passage of a CSR proposal is a random outcome in an 
arbitrarily small interval around the majority vote threshold (50%) (for example, whether a proposal 
passes by 50.1% or by 49.9% is arguably random). Accordingly, such close-call CSR proposals 
provide a source of random variation in the adoption of CSR proposals that can be used to estimate the 
causal effect of passing a CSR proposal on peer firms’ performance. Our estimate of such an effect 
using RDD is not affected by omitted variables even if they are correlated with the vote as long as the 
effects are continuous around the threshold. 
We perform the RDD by using a nonparametric, ―local‖ linear estimation. Small neighborhoods 
to the left-hand and right-hand sides of the threshold are used to estimate the discontinuity in peer 
firms’ reactions. By choosing the optimal bandwidth to the left and right of the cutoff point (threshold), 
                                                          
7
 We cross-validate the information on joint venturing deal announcement between the Zephyr and SDC.  
8
 The regression discontinuity design has been used in several papers, including Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012); 
Flammer (2015); Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2015).  
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the nonparametric linear estimation approach allows us to capture the difference in the stock market 
reaction and future CSR performance between peers who observe the passing and failure of a CSR 
proposal by their associated voting firm. In addition, the RDD requires no other observable covariates 
(control variables) for identification. The local linear regression model can therefore be specified as: 
                         ,                                   (1) 
where     is the stock market reaction (CAR) or CSR score in year t+1 of the peer firm i,        is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the peer firm’s associated voting firm passes a CSR-related proposal—i.e., more 
than 50% of the votes are in favor of adopting the CSR proposal—and 0 otherwise, and     is the 
percentage of vote shares favoring the CSR proposal, centered at the 50% threshold. The estimate of   
captures the discontinuity at the majority threshold—the difference in outcome between peer firms of 
the voting firm that marginally passes a CSR proposal and peer firms of the voting firm that marginally 
fails a CSR proposal—and hence provides a consistent estimate of the causal effect of passing a CSR 
proposal on peer firms’    .  
 
3.3. Tests for a quasi-randomized assignment 
Our identification strategy requires that passing or failing a close-call CSR proposal is nearly random 
to peer firms’ characteristics. In this subsection, we perform two diagnostic tests to ensure the validity 
of the identifying assumption (randomness assumption) of the RDD that shareholders of the voting 
company cannot precisely manipulate the forcing variable (i.e., vote shares) near the known cutoff 
(Lee and Lemieux (2010)). If this assumption is satisfied, the variation in the passage of CSR 
proposals is as good as that from a randomized experiment. 
 
3.3.1. Continuity in the distribution of shareholder votes 
We first test whether the distribution of shareholder votes is continuous around the majority threshold, 
that is, 50% of vote shares. We follow McCrary (2008) and provide a formal test of the discontinuity in 
the density, which checks for the smoothness of the density function around the threshold. A random 
assignment of pass versus fail at the small margin implies that the vote-share distribution should be 
smooth and continuous around the majority threshold. Figure 1 visually confirms this. A more formal 
test is provided in Figure 2, which plots the density of shareholder votes. The dots depict the density 
and the solid line represents the percentage of votes for CSR. The density appears generally smooth, 
with no evidence for a discontinuous jump around the threshold. The P-value is 0.1556, which fails to 
13 
 
reject the null of continuity of the density function at the threshold. With the McCrary (2008) test 
result, we confirm no precise manipulation exists and the assumption of smoothness is validated. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
3.3.2. Pre-existing differences 
The randomness assumption of our RDD setting also requires that the peer firms of companies whose 
voting shares are marginally below or above the majority threshold should be very similar on the basis 
of ex-ante characteristics. That is, if the passage of close-call CSR proposals is akin to a random 
assignment, it should be unrelated to peer-firm characteristics prior to the vote. Intuitively, there is 
little reason to believe that such a voting outcome is directly affected by peer-firm characteristics. To 
justify this, we show in Table 3 the differences of a few key firm-characteristic variables for these two 
peer groups (for simplicity, we hereafter call them ―passing peers‖ and ―failing peers,‖ which refer to 
peer firms of the voting firm that passes a close-call CSR proposal and those of the voting firm that 
fails a close-call CSR proposal, respectively). As shown in columns (1) and (2), before voting on CSR 
proposals, firm characteristics—firm size, market-to-book ratio, book leverage, return on assets (ROA), 
and CSR scores—of passing peers and failing peers are not very different. From column (3), the 
difference between passing peers and failing peers in general are statistically significant for firm size 
and market-to-book ratio, but such significance completely disappears in column (4) in which we 
compare their differences at the small margin around the threshold.
9
 Overall, this evidence suggests 
that no systematic and significant difference exists between passing peers and failing peers around the 
majority threshold, which gives support to our identification strategy.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
4. Main Results  
4.1. The Effects of CSR adoption on peer firms’ stock returns and subsequent CSR levels 
                                                          
9
 We conduct the tests using optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The numbers of 
observation vary across different variables because their optimal bandwidths are different. The numbers of 
observation range from 2,199 to 4,642 for failing peers and range from 620 to 853 for passing peers in column (4). 
Our results do not change when we test the pre-existing difference within some other specified small margins such as 
[48%, 52%] or [49%, 51%]. 
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Having validated the randomness assumption of our RDD setting, we then test the peer effects of CSR 
by focusing on peer firms’ stock returns and subsequent-year CSR levels following the voting firm’s 
passage/rejection of close-call CSR proposal. We first present the RDD results in Figure 3 to visualize 
how non-voting firms react to the results of a voting firm’s CSR proposal. Specifically, we divide the 
spectrum of vote shares into 50 bins (with a bin width of 2% of vote shares). The non-voting peer firms’ 
reactions of voting firms which reject a CSR proposal are plotted in the left of the 50% threshold and 
those of voting firms which pass a CSR proposal are plotted in the right of the 50% threshold.  
 Figure 3a and Figure 3b show the discontinuity in both spontaneous market reaction ([-1, +1] 
CAR) and subsequent CSR adoption (adjusted KLD score in year t+1) in non-voting peer firms at the 
threshold. Specifically, we find a lower CAR of passing peers compared with that of failing peers. 
Following the passage of a CSR proposal in the voting firm, the passing peers demonstrate a better 
CSR performance compared with the failing peers. The figures are supportive to our conjects on CSR-
peer effects.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
We next formally test the impact of exogenously generated variation in CSR on the peer firms’ 
value and subsequent CSR performance by relying on a local nonparametric linear regression approach 
by estimating Eq. (1). In Table 4, we report the results of our baseline specifications, which estimate 
the difference in returns and CSR adoption between passing peers and failing peers as defined above.
10
 
To account for potential information leakage right before the shareholder meeting and the possibility 
that it may take some time for investors to digest voting outcomes, we use peer firms’ CARs over a 
three-day event window (Day -1 to Day 1, with Day 0 being the day of shareholder vote).
11
 We also 
explore the sensitivity of the results to a range of bandwidths. Panel A of Table 4 shows the results in 
peer firms’ CARs. As is evident in Panel A, the estimates of the difference in CARs between passing 
peers and failing peers for a small margin around the threshold are consistently negative and mostly 
significant at the 1% level when we use the optimal bandwidth in column (1) as well as 50%, 75%, and 
150% of the optional bandwidth as shown in columns (2)–(4), all estimated using the rectangular 
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 For these baseline specifications, we test the discontinuity at the majority threshold—i.e., 50%. For placebo tests, 
we conduct the same analysis at other cutoffs (e.g. 45%, 35%, 55%, 65%, etc.) and find no evidence of discontinuity 
for both CAR and subsequent CSR activities, which supports our argument that the effects on peer firms' CARs are 
generated by the exogenous increase of CSR level of the voting firm caused by marginally passing the CSR proposal.  
11
 The RDD estimate for abnormal return on the voting day—i.e., day 0, is negative -0.28%—but insignificant. The 
estimate for cumulative return on the voting day and the day after the voting day—i.e., day [0, +1], is -0.49%—





A very similar result is obtained when the difference in CARs is estimated using the triangular 
kernel, as in column (5).
13
 The differences in three-day CARs between passing peers and failing peers 
range from -0.58% to -0.76%, indicating that passing peers experience lower abnormal returns than 
failing peers. 
Flammer (2015) finds a positive and significant difference in voting firms’ one-day abnormal 
returns on the day of the vote (AR[0]) between those that marginally pass and those that marginally 
fail a CSR proposal, which ranges from 0.92% to 1.18% depending on model specifications (with an 
average of 1.07%). The magnitudes of our estimates are smaller than that of Flammer (2015), which is 
reasonably expected since peer firms may indeed react less strongly than voting firms due to 
information distance and the heterogeneity across peer firms. This result implies that the passage of 
CSR proposals by a small margin of votes on average leads to a significant decrease in peer firms’ 
shareholder value in relation to the marginal rejection of CSR proposals. This is consistent with the 
notion that CSR has strategic value and firms observing their competitors adopting such strategic CSR 
practice could lose their competitive edge, causing a negative stock market reaction to the news of 
their competitors gaining an advantage.  
We then explore whether and how a firm’s adoption of a CSR proposal affects its peer firms’ 
CSR practice. To do so, we use the same model specifications as in Panel A, but now the outcome 
variable Y is the peer firm’s CSR score in the next calendar year after the passage of the voting firm’s 
close-call CSR proposal, instead of the peer firm’s CARs. Panel B of Table 4 reports the estimates of 
the difference in the following-year CSR level between passing peers and failing peers. It is clearly 
shown that the estimates are positive and statistically significant above the 5% level across different 
specifications of bandwidth and kernel.
14
 The point estimate is around 0.16 (as in column (1)), 
indicating that the difference in CSR levels between passing peers and failing peers is as large as 0.16 
points. Given that the adjusted KLD score has a mean of -0.13 points and a standard deviation of 0.42 
points, a difference of 0.16 points (more than 30% of the standard deviation) should be economically 
sizable. This result implies that when a voting firm adopts a CSR proposal, its peer firms will 
significantly increase their CSR practice, which is in line with the argument that peer firms perceive 
                                                          
12
 Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), we estimate the effect of CSR proposal passage within the optimal 
bandwidth. A narrower bandwidth indicates a lower bias and higher variance. The optimal bandwidth for CAR [-1, 
+1] as an outcome variable is 0.14. 50% of the optimal bandwidth is half of the optimal bandwidth—i.e., 0.07.  
13
 According to Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the choice of kernel has little impact on the estimation in practice, 
though using rectangular kernel is a more common practice.  
14
 The optimal bandwidth for RDD estimation with adjusted KLD score as the outcome variable is 0.156. 
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CSR as strategically valuable and will improve their CSR performance to maintain their edge after 
observing their rivals adopt it. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.2. Robustness 
The previous analysis using a nonparametric local linear estimation gives an unbiased estimate of   , 
which captures differences in peer firms’ average Y between CSR proposals that pass or fail by a small 
margin of votes. We next extend the regression discontinuity analysis with an estimation of a global 
polynomial series model by including polynomials of order three on both sides of the threshold.
15
 
Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
                                             ,                                 (2) 
where     is the outcome variable of the (non-voting) peer firm—i.e., three-day CAR over the 
event window [-1, +1] or adjusted KLD score in year t+1.        is a dummy that equals 1 if the voting 
firm passes the CSR proposal—i.e., the vote percentage is higher than 50%, and 0 otherwise. 
           is a flexible polynomial function for observations on the left-hand side of the majority 
threshold   (50% in our case) with different orders, and            is a flexible polynomial function for 
observations on the right-hand side of the threshold   with different orders.   is the percentage of 
shares favoring the CSR proposal. We choose a polynomial order of 3 for our analysis.     is a set of 
control variables. 
The estimate of   is the variable of interest and the magnitude shows the difference in these 
two smoothed functions at the cutoff, therefore capturing the effects of passing a CSR proposal on 
non-voting peers’ firm value and subsequent CSR performance. The results are shown in Table 5, with 
columns (1) and (2) excluding control variables (    ), and columns (3) and (4) including control 
variables ( ). Again, the difference in CARs between passing peers and failing peers is negative and 
significant, indicating that passing peers experience lower announcement returns, whereas the 
difference in following-year CSR between passing and failing peers is positive and significant. The 
economic effects are somewhat larger for peer firms’ CARs, with a difference of 1.084% in CARs 
between passing peers and failing peers when we include control variables, and are similar for peer 
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 The global polynomial approach, however, fails to take into consideration the strong locality and weak externality 
of RDD, which are important features of the approach (Bakke and Whited (2012)).  
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firms’ following-year CSR.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In addition to triangulating our empirical results using a global polynomial approach, we also 
conduct a few robustness tests with alternative outcome measures and alternative peer samples. We 
first check whether the results are driven by measurement errors in the outcome variables. First, for 
each vote, we treat all of the associated non-voting peers as a portfolio and we take the averages of 
their responses—i.e., the average of three-day CARs and the average of adjusted KLD scores—as the 
outcome variables and conduct the same tests.
16
 The results are reported in column (1) of Table 6 
(Panel A for CAR and Panel B for the adjusted KLD score). Consistent with our previous results, we 
find a significant and negative response from the equity market: the average difference in [-1, +1] CAR 
between passing and failing peers is -0.85% (t-stat=2.73). We also find significant and positive results 
when non-voting peers’ average adjusted KLD score is the outcome variable, indicating that the 
passage of a firm’s close-call CSR proposal leads to a relative improvement in CSR performance of its 
non-voting peers. In addition, we check the robustness of our results using alternative measures of 
stock market response and CSR scores. Specifically, we run nonparametric local linear regressions 
with the CARs estimated by the Fama-French three-factor model and the CARs estimated by the 
Carhart four-factor model as dependent variables, respectively. The empirical results shown in 
columns (2) and (3) of Panel A of Table 6 confirm our previous findings that the passage of a CSR 
proposal leads to lower stock market returns of passing peers. In Panel B, columns (2) and (3) of Table 
6, we measure CSR performance using a raw KLD Score and the change in the adjusted KLD score 
from year -1 to year +1. The RDD estimates using the above two alternative CSR performance 
measures are consistent with our previous findings. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
Further, we check whether our results are biased by the choice of peer firms in our sample. To 
do so, we conduct a similar analysis on alternative samples of peer firms. We first use alternative 
                                                          
16
 We recognize that linking CSR votes to non-voting peers changes the structure of the data, which might bias the 
empirical results as the non-voting firms are clustered at the vote level. By taking the average of the non-voting peer 
firms’ response, we could address this concern. 
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samples based on different industry classifications and different sample periods. Panel A of Table 7 
reports results from these alternative samples, with sample (a) defined as peers over a 3-digit SIC, and 
samples (b) and (c) using the original Hoberg-Phillips classification of peers but covering the periods 
from 2003 to 2011 and from 2005 to 2011, respectively. The two alternative samples in (b) and (c) are 
chosen because the KLD data experienced structural changes in 2003 and 2005. In 2003, KLD 
dramatically increased its sample coverage by adding the full coverage of the Russell 3000, and in 
2005 KLD expanded its CSR measurement categories by adding several ―Strengths‖ and ―Concerns‖ 
measures into the database.
17
 Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results of non-voting peers’ three-day 
CARs around the voting firm’s shareholder meeting, and columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results of 
non-voting peers’ adjusted KLD scores one year after voting firms’ shareholder meeting in which the 
CSR proposal is voted. The previous results are again supported in these alternative samples based on 
different industry classifications and sample periods: passing peers experience lower CARs and a more 
significant increase in CSR performance in the subsequent year relative to failing peers, and the 
economic magnitudes are similar to our initial results.  
We also notice that the numbers of peers differ significantly across different voting firms—i.e., 
from 1 to 272. To address the concern that our results might be biased by an imbalanced distribution of 
peer firms, we conduct similar tests on samples with a pre-determined number of peer firms. 
Specifically, we randomly select samples with several arbitrarily chosen numbers of peers as shown in 
Panel B of Table 7: 30 peers for sample (d), 40 peers for sample (e), and 50 peers for sample (f). Again, 
the results of the three-day event CARs and following-year KLD scores are reported and the estimated 
differences are consistent with previous findings, and have similar statistical and economic 
significance. These alternative sample analyses give further support to our conjecture that a firm’s 
adoption of CSR can cause a decline of stock prices and future improvement in CSR of its peer firms.
18
 
As a further robustness check, we examine whether the above results are driven by 
confounding factors—such as market sentiments which may also explain the decrease in CARs and the 
increase in CSR levels of peer firms—by conducting a placebo test on non-voting firms that are not 
product market peers of the voting firms. We find one matched firm for each non-voting peer by 
requiring the two firms to be the same in size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage ratio decile. If more 
than one non-peer firm is found, we keep the one with the firm size closest to the peer firm. Based on 
our product market competition argument, one would expect no significant reactions by these non-
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 In addition, the year 2005 is the starting year that RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent, our two data sets, merged. 
18
 Empirical results for other random samples (20, 25, 60 peers, etc.) are similar and available upon request. 
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peers to the voting firm’s adoption of a CSR proposal. This is indeed the case as shown in Panel C of 
Table 7. The differences between passing peers and failing peers in stock returns (event-day abnormal 
returns in column (1), two-day and three-day CARs in columns (2) and (3)) and the adjusted KLD 
scores are not statistically significant and the point estimates are much smaller. This indicates that a 
voting firm’s adoption of CSR does not affect non-peer firms, which gives further support to our 
argument that the observed differences in peer firms’ stock returns and CSR are induced by the voting 
firm’s CSR strategy rather than by other factors such as market sentiment. 
One may be concerned that our results reflect the effects of other types of proposals rather than 
CSR proposals, as during a shareholder meeting there are usually various types of proposals—
especially proposals on corporate governance—being voted. Therefore, in our final robustness check, 
we conduct two placebo tests to examine whether such confounding effects may explain our findings 
and report our results in Panel D of Table 7.  In the first placebo test, we exclude all proposals on 
corporate governance and run the same RDD analysis, the results on three-day CARs (column (1)) and 
following-year CSR (column (2)) remain statistically significant and have the ―right‖ signs, indicating 
our previous findings are not entirely driven by confounding proposals on corporate governance. The 
economic effects are attenuated for CARs, but the magnitude is still comparable to that in Table 4, and 
the economic effects of following-year CSR remain the same. In the second placebo test, we randomly 
select 1,407 proposals—the same number as that for our sample of CSR proposals—from all proposals 
casted in our sample firms, and we don’t find any significant result for three-day CARs (column (3)). 
This is consistent with our argument that peer firms mainly react to the voting firm’s CSR adoption (as 
they perceive it as a threat), rather than other random proposals casted by shareholders of the voting 
firm.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.3. Which CSR matters? 
Given the abovementioned findings that a firm’s CSR adoption can affect it peer firms’ CSR strategies, 
one may wonder how peer firms change their CSR practice: do these firms actively launch new 
initiatives aiming at solidifying their strengths of social performance, or do they reduce their 
production of negative societal externalities? To answer these questions, we decompose the overall 
KLD score into ―Strengths‖ and ―Concerns‖ for each KLD dimension. ―Strengths‖ capture a firm’s 
voluntary engagement in CSR issues while ―Concerns‖ capture (potential) negative externalities 
20 
 
produced by the firm. For example, under the ―Environment‖ dimension, ―Strengths‖ include 
environmentally beneficial products and services (that promote the efficient use of energy), pollution 
prevention, recycling, clean energy, communication in environmental issues (e.g., a signatory to the 
CERES Principles, a notably substantive environmental report, an effective internal communications 
systems in place for environmental best practice, etc.), as well as property, plans, and equipment 
having an above-average environment performance. ―Concerns‖ under this dimension include hazard 
waste, regulatory problems, ozone depleting chemicals, substantial emissions, agricultural chemicals, 
and climate change (substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products).
19
 
We conduct the same tests on peers’ following-year CSR as previously conducted, with the exception 
of replacing the adjusted KLD score with KLD ―Strengths‖ and KLD ―Concerns.‖ As shown in Panel 
A of Table 8, the RDD estimate of ―Strengths‖ is statistically significant at the 5% level, while the 
estimate of ―Concerns‖ is insignificant. This may imply that the effects on the change of passing peers’ 
CSR seem to come from their focus on ―Strengths‖ (launching new initiatives aiming at strengthening 
the firms’ social engagement), rather than on ―Concerns‖ (reducing negative externalities).  
We also decompose the overall adjusted KLD score into a few sub-dimensions, such as 
Environment, Employee Relationship, and Workforce Diversity, which are the most important aspects 
of CSR,
20
 and conduct the same analysis on these sub-dimensions. As shown in Panel B of Table 8, the 
CSR scores of the passing peers all significantly increase across these sub-dimensions, giving further 
support to our hypothesis that CSR is strategically valuable and can induce peer firms to enhance their 
competitive positions by upgrading their engagement in environmental, employment, and other 
workforce issues. 
Given the above findings on KLD sub-scores, a natural question that arises is whether peer 
firms match the specific CSR strategy that the voting firm adopts. That is, if the voting firm passes a 
proposal to enhance its environmental strategy which is perceived by its peer firms as a competitive 
threat, these peers will also adopt more environment-related CSR strategies. To test this sub-hypothesis 
of competitive advantage, we further decompose CSR proposals into different types by reading 
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 Besides the ―Environment‖ dimension as explained in the text, the ―Employee Relations‖ dimension considers 
company engagement in treating a unionized workforce fairly, maintaining a consistent no-layoff policy, a cash 
profit-sharing program, employee stock option plans, retirement benefits, health and safety programs, etc. The 
―Workforce Diversity‖ dimension considers whether a company engages in promoting a female or minority CEO and 
board of directors, providing childcare, elder care, or flextime, women and minority contracting, innovation hiring 
programs for the disabled, progressive policies toward gay and lesbian employees, etc. 
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through the texts in all these proposals, and classify them into environment-related proposals, 
workforce diversity-related proposals, and proposals related to employee relationship. We then 
conduct the same analysis as in Panel B on these subsamples of different types of CSR proposals, and 
report the results in Panels C, D and E, respectively. We indeed find evidence that peer firms match 
with the voting firm’s specific CSR strategies: In Panel C which comprises peer firms associated with 
environment-related proposals, only the difference in Environment Score between passing and failing 
peers is significant. In Panel D which comprises peer firms associated with proposals related to 
workforce diversity, their reaction in the Diversity dimension is the strongest. In Panel E with only 
proposals related to Employee Relationship, only the estimate of Employee Relationship Score is 
significant, i.e., peer firms only significantly improve their engagement in issues related to employee 
relationship. Overall, the empirical evidence in Table 8 suggests that firms react to their competitor’s 
CSR adoption by engaging more in solidifying their CSR strengths and matching with the specific 
CSR strategies of their competitor. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Channels of Peer Effects: Subsample Analysis 
The previous results demonstrate that strong CSR-peer effects exist among firms in the same product 
market and industry. In this section, we try to explore several potential channels that may account for 
such peer effects by conducting a few subsample analyses. These subsample analyses—including the 
roles of the voting and peer firms’ competitive relation, as well as peer firms’ financial constraints, 
information transparency, and corporate governance—also enable us to further rule out some 
alternative explanations for the above findings.  
 
5.1. The role of competitive relations 
We first examine how the competitive relation between the voting firm and its peers affects the 
peer effects of CSR. We first examine the competitive pressure between the voting firm and its non-
voting peer firms. If the competitive advantage argument holds, we should expect higher competitive 
pressure to magnify the peer effects, because any incremental competitiveness in the voting firm may 
force the non-voting peers out of the product market. Therefore, the differences in the stock market 
reaction and the subsequent CSR performance are expected to be more pronounced in the subsample 
with higher level of competitive pressure. To test the above argument, we rely on the variable Fluidity, 
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an ex-ante, forward-looking measure of a firm’s competitive threats (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 
(2014)), which captures changes in competing firms’ products relative to the firm’s products (it 
measures the change in a firm’s product space due to moves made by competitors in the firm’s product 
markets). This fluidity variable is constructed based on a firm’s product descriptions in its 10-Ks 
according to how competitors are changing the product words that overlap with the focal firm’s 
vocabulary. When Fluidity is greater, the firm’s products are more similar to its peers’ and thus the 
competitive threat is greater.
21
 Specifically, we partition the peer firms into two groups according to 
their associated voting firms’ Fluidity level in the year before the vote, and the high Fluidity group is 
subject to more competitive pressure than the low Fluidity group. A High Fluidity group is defined as 
peer firms whose corresponding voting-firm’s Fluidity score is above the median of the whole voting-
firm sample, and a Low Fluidity group is defined as peer firms whose corresponding voting-firm’s 
Fluidity score is below the median of the whole voting-firm sample. The results based on this Fluidity 
measure are reported in Panel A of Table 9. Consistent with the competitive advantage argument, we 
find that the results are only significant in the subsample in which the competitive pressure is high (the 
high Fluidity group).  
In addition to competitive pressures, the competitive relation between the voting firm and its 
non-voting peers could also be manifested by their relative CSR performance. Based on the 
competitive advantage argument, if CSR is a way of obtaining a competitive edge, one may expect that 
peer firms with a previously leading position in CSR would also react more strongly to the voting 
firm’s adoption of a CSR proposal because they see it as a stronger threat to their existing competitive 
position. In Panel B of Table 9 we test how the difference in KLD scores between the voting firm and 
its non-voting peers in the year prior to the vote can influence peer firms’ reactions. We find that when 
the gap of KLD scores between peer firms and the voting firm is positive (peer firms had a higher level 
of CSR than the voting firm), passing peers experience further lower event CARs and a bigger increase 
in following-year KLD scores compared to failing peers (columns (1) and (3)). Such significant 
reactions are not found for peers with lower past KLD scores than the voting firm (columns (2) and 
(4)). These results suggest that the relative level of a peer firm’s past-CSR performance substantially 
matters for how they react to a rival firm’s adoption of CSR; firms with a better past CSR performance 
react more strongly to their rivals’ CSR adoption. 
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 We do not use a traditional HHI measure or market share because peers are identified by the product, rather than by 
a specified industry. Fluidity, which is obtained from 10-K files, shows the competitive dynamics between a firm and 
its peers identified through a text-based analysis. We admit that the usage of Fluidity fails to capture the competition 
between one firm and one specific peer firm. 
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Taken together, our empirical results suggest that the competitive relationship between the 
voting firms and the non-voting peer firms plays an important role in shaping peer effects of CSR. The 
higher competitive pressure from the voting firm and relatively better previous CSR performance of 
the peer firm would intensify peer effects, leading to a more pronounced market reaction and a bigger 
improvement of subsequent CSR performance of the peer firm.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 
5.2. The role of the non-voting firm’s financial constraints 
Second, we explore the role of peer firms’ financial constraints, which can limit both a firm’s 
competitiveness (Campello (2006)) and its capability to be socially responsible—that is, firms are 
more likely to engage in CSR when they have fewer financial constraints, which is usually dubbed as 
―doing good by doing well‖ (e.g., Hong et al. (2012)). Following this logic, the negative effects on 
passing peers’ (compared to failing peers’) stock returns should be stronger in firms with more 
financial constraints because the competitive threats are stronger. In addition, the positive effects on 
peer firms’ subsequent increase in CSR level should be stronger in firms with less financial constraints 
because they have more financial flexibility to engage in CSR. Several measures of financial 
constraints exist, but according to Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (hereafter ―HP‖), most of these measures 
generally suffer from containing too much noise from various firm attributes besides firm size and age. 
Therefore, we use the financial constraints index developed by HP and partition our peer sample into a 
high financially constrained sample and a low financially constrained sample. To further validate the 
results based on the HP index, we conduct the same analysis on the subsamples partitioned by whether 
the non-voting peer firm distributed dividends in year t-1, as dividend payment is usually interpreted as 
an indication of having low financial constraints.  
The results are reported in Table 10, which gives support to our hypothesis on the role of 
financial constraints. In Panel A with the HP index as the financial constraints measure, passing peers 
with a higher level of financial constraints experience lower announcement-period CARs (column (1)) 
and a moderate increase in following-year CSR scores (column (3)), while less financially constrained 
firms experience no significantly lower announcement-period CARs (column (2)) and a stronger 
increase in following-year CSR scores (column (4)), all relative to failing peers. In Panel B of Table 10, 
passing peers that do not pay dividends (a symptom of being more financially constrained) experience 
lower announcement CARs (column (1)) and no significant increase in CSR in the year after (column 
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(3)), while passing peers that pay dividends do not experience significantly lower CARs (column (2)) 
and substantially increase their CSR level in the following year (column (4)), again all relative to 
failing peers. These results are consistent with the notion that the likelihood of peer firms’ future 
adoption of a similar CSR strategy to catch up with their competitor is anticipated by their investors 
and is reflected in these peers’ stock returns. When investors expect that their firms have greater 
capability (lower financial constraints) of catching up in the future, they ―punish‖ their firms less on 
the stock market (thus less negative CARs). 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
5.3. The role of the non-voting firm’s corporate information environment 
Third, we investigate the role of the corporate information environment in shaping the 
magnitude of CSR-peer effects. A transparent environment enables investors to access corporate 
information in a timely manner. Therefore, the competitive threats caused by an increased CSR 
performance in the voting firm will attract more investor attention and lead to a more pronounced 
market reaction when there is less information opacity. In addition, transparency also motivates firms 
to behave in a socially responsible way. On the one hand, firms that are more visible could create 
higher value from being socially responsible (Servaes and Tamayo (2013)). On the other hand, 
irresponsible behaviors are more likely to be identified when the firm has a less opaque information 
environment—e.g., followed by more financial analysts (Dong, Lin, and Zhan (2015)). Therefore, we 
expect that passing peers that are more visible will increase their engagement in CSR activities more 
significantly compared with failing peers.  
We use financial analyst coverage and firm size to capture the information transparency in non-
voting peer firms. Specifically, we split the peer sample into a high financial analyst coverage group 
and a low financial analyst coverage group according to the number of unique financial analysts 
following the firm in year t-1. In Panel A of Table 11, we tablet the empirical results. Consistent with 
the above argument, we only find a significant (at the 1% level) lower market reaction for passing 
peers in the high financial analyst coverage group, with a point estimate of -0.75%. The result in the 
low financial analyst coverage group is not statistically significant. Column (2) of Panel A reports the 
results for the subsequent-year CSR score for the two subgroups and peer firms with more financial 
analyst coverage increases their CSR performance to a larger extent when the voting firm passes a 
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CSR proposal. In Panel B, we report the empirical results conditional on the firm size of the non-
voting peers. Consistent with the above argument, we find that our results are only significant when the 
peer firms are more visible—i.e., have a larger firm size.22 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
 Taken together, our subsample analyses confirm that the peer effects of CSR come from the 
competitive relation between the voting firm and its non-voting product market peers. In addition, the 
magnitude of differences in market reaction and subsequent-year CSR performance between passing 
peers and failing peers is affected by peer firms’ financial constraints and information transparency. In 
our unreported tests, we also investigate the role of corporate governance on following-year CSR 
performance.
23
 Better corporate governance could help mitigate the conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. As the passage of a CSR proposal increases competitive threats that reduce 
shareholder value, better-governed firms are expected to be more responsive and thus enhance their 
CSR engagement to a greater extent. Using the G-Index as a proxy for corporate governance quality, 




5.4. Long-run effects on peers 
If CSR is an effective tool to gain competitive advantage on the product market, its adoption 
will have substantial effect on a firm’s performance over the long term. Therefore, in this session we 
evaluate the effects of the voting firm’s CSR adoption on its peers’ long-run outcomes, as opposed to 
short-run market reaction and following-year CSR adoption. In particular, we compare the difference 
in operating performance between passing peers and failing peers two years after the passage of the 
voting firm’s CSR proposal. The two-year horizon is chosen because, on one hand, it follows the 
sequence of dynamic competition: the voting firm adopts CSR in year t, its competitors follow in year 
t+1, and these competitors’ operating performance improves in year t+2. On the other hand, 
considering longer time horizon (beyond t+2) may introduce more noises which make it difficult to 
                                                          
22
 One could argue that the competitive threats created by a passed CSR proposal are smaller for larger firms and 
therefore larger firms should not react very significantly. However, the competitive relation in our study is 
determined on a product similarity base. Therefore it is possible that a big firm could be vulnerable in a particular 
product market. 
23
 These results are available upon request. 
24
 We measure a firm’s internal governance by using the G-index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), 
which has been updated to the year 2008 by the IRRC. The G-index is updated biannually. For years without 
coverage by the G-index, we take the previous year’s index value for that year’s governance score.  
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gauge the true effects of CSR on performance. We consider three measures of long-run performance: 
return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), and sales growth rate. 
The results on these long-run performance measures are shown in Table 12. Panel A shows the 
RDD estimates of the difference between ROE, ROS, and sales growth rate between passing peers and 
failing peers two years after their affiliated voting firm passed the close-call CSR proposal. The results 
indicate that all these operating performance measures are significantly higher in passing peer firms, 
consistent with the notion that the catch-up strategy of CSR by the passing peers helps them regain 
some competitive advantages. In Panel B, we partition our sample firms into those with high financial 
constraints and those with low financial constraints using the Hadlock-Pierce Index. Similar to the 
results shown in Table 10, the significant improvement in operating performance of peer firms 
following their catch-up in CSR exclusively comes from those with low levels of financial constraints. 
That is, the regained competitive advantage is mostly realized in peer firms without financial burdens 
to do so. Overall, these results suggest that there is a long-lasting improvement in operating 
performance in peer firms that catch up with their CSR practice, and are consistent with the notion that 
CSR can be value-enhancing. 
 
[Insert Table 12 about Here] 
 
6. Extension: Peer Effects on Strategic Alliance Partners 
Two potential alternative explanations—other than the competitive advantage hypothesis—may 
account for the above results on CARs and following-year CSR, respectively. The first one is based on 
a ―herding‖ hypothesis, that after observing a firm’s adoption of CSR, peer firms may simply ―herd‖ to 
do more CSR in the next year due to peer pressures or industry norms. The second one is based on 
investor expectation on the cost of CSR and is related to the herding hypothesis, that peer firms’ 
investors expect that their firms will mimic the voting firm’s adoption of CSR, which can be costly 
thus a deviation from value maximization, and therefore the lower announcement CARs reflect their 
negative reaction to this expectation. To investigate the validity of these alternative explanations, one 
could examine the reactions of a group of firms which are in a non-competing (and ideally cooperative) 
relationship with the same voting firms, such as partners in strategic alliances. The above alternative 
explanations would predict a similar effect on alliance partners (negative CARs due to investors’ 
expectation about money-wasting CSR investment in the future induced by alliances’ herding). 
Therefore, in this section, we extend our analysis of CSR-peer effects to the context of alliance 
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partners. Beyond competition and rivalry, forming a strategic alliance through which production, 
technology, and profits are shared could also connect firms (e.g., Robinson (2008), Robinson and 
Stuart (2007)).
25
 A large literature exists on the value creation through alliance partners (e.g., Berg and 
Friedman (1981), Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006), McConnell and Nantell (1985), Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997)), and some recent studies also examine the spillover effects 
among alliance partners (Boone and Ivanov (2012), Cao, Chordia, and Lin (2015)).
26
 Following the 
logic that CSR creates competitive advantages, alliance partners of a firm that adopts new CSR 
proposals are more likely to benefit from such a competitive advantage through their alliance 
connection and enhance their own CSR practice as well.  
We retrieve the sample of alliances from the Securities Data Company (SDC) platinum 
database,
27
 which includes both joint ventures and non-joint ventures. We keep only alliance deals that 
have at least two U.S. public companies traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We define firms 
in a deal as partners and then match the alliance data with Compustat and CRSP to construct the links 
among partners.
28
 In the contract, an alliance has a start date and an expiration date. For the start date, 
we set it as being from the next month of the deal announcement date to ensure that all partner 
relations in our sample are publicly known ones. For the termination date, however, only 2% of 
alliance deals in our sample have available termination dates as disclosed in the database. Therefore, 
for deals with valid termination dates, we consider the partnership as lasting until the deal termination 
date; for deals with missing termination dates, we assume the partnership lasts for five years from the 
dates of the deal announcement.
29
 Thus, our CSR test sample starting in 1997 could still be affected by 
previous alliances that began as early as 1992. After matching the firm-partner link data with CSR 
                                                          
25
 For example, Starbucks and PepsiCo formed a joint venture in 1994 to market ready-to-drink coffee products 
including Starbucks® bottled Frappuccino. Tivo Inc., a provider in television services for digital video recorders, and 
Domino’s pizza formed a strategic alliance in 2008 such that all broadband connected TiVo user could 
order Domino’s pizza using the TiVo® service. For 16 years, American Express (AmEx) partnered with COSTCO 
and was the only credit card accepted at the store. Their partnership failed to renew in 2015 and Visa, Inc. replaced 
AmEx.  
26
 Boone and Ivanov (2012) find that firms experience a negative price reaction around their alliance partners’ 
bankruptcy filings. Cao et al. (2015) find that partners’ lagged return predicts a firm’s future return in the cross-
section.  
27
 SDC collects the alliance announcement data from sources such as SEC filings, trade publications, and public news. 
A random check on Factiva suggests the media promptly covers alliance formations. 
28
 We use the SDC’s 6-digit historical CUSIP (NCUSIP) to match with the CRSP common stocks 8-digit NCUSIP at 
the time of alliance announcements. For companies with multiple common shares, we keep the one with the largest 
market cap on the announcement dates.  
29
 Cao et al. (2015) also use a five-year duration for alliances without valid termination dates. In the online appendix, 
it is shown that the results are consistent for alternative assumptions of a three-year duration or until 2012.  
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proposals and KLD data, the sample contains 9,148 (non-voting) partner-vote observations from 1,392 
unique U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2011.
30
 
Using the same analogy for peers, we call the alliance partners of the firm that marginally 
passes the CSR proposal ―passing partners,‖ and those partnered with the firm that marginally rejects 
the CSR proposal ―failing partners.‖ Table 13 presents the results: columns (1)—(3) report the 
difference in the AR on the announcement day, the CAR over the event window [0,+1], and the CAR 
over the event window [-1,+1], respectively; columns (4)—(5) report the difference in following-year 
adjusted KLD score and the change of adjusted KLD score from one year before the vote to one year 
after the vote. The differences in the CARs between passing partners and failing partners are all 
positive and statistically significant above the 10% level throughout columns (1)—(3). The economic 
magnitudes are even larger than the previously identified effects for product market peers. For example, 
the difference in the three-day CARs (column (3)) between passing partners and failing partners is 
1.17%, compared to -0.58% between passing peers and failing peers. The positive difference in the 
CARs suggests that the investors tend to have a positive reaction when their firms’ partner in an 
alliance or joint venture marginally passes a CSR proposal. This result is consistent with prior studies 
that have demonstrated that the adoption of CSR proposals is positive news for the firm (Flammer 
(2015)) and causes spillover effects of positive news to the firm’s alliance partners (Cao et al. (2015)).  
The difference in subsequent-year CSR between passing partners and failing partners is also 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that when a voting firm adopts a CSR initiative, its 
alliance partners will also significantly increase their CSR practice. Such alliance effects of CSR may 
be due to at least three reasons. First, firms in an alliance interact more frequently and are thus more 
likely to learn from their partners’ value-enhancing strategies such as CSR engagement. Second, firms 
in an alliance might be more likely to merge in the future (e.g., Cao, Chordia, Lin, and Zhan (2015)). 
Such a likelihood of merger and integration at a higher level may make alliance partners become more 
―similar‖ in their corporate policies and strategic plans such as CSR policies. Third, as CSR is 
sometimes costly, firms in an alliance network may need collaborations from their partners on CSR 
activities. Hence, depending on their bargaining powers, they might encourage or even demand their 
partners to engage more in CSR in the future to support their own CSR initiatives. 
                                                          
30
 This sample is smaller than the (non-voting) peer firm-vote sample (38,630 observations) for two reasons: (1) the 
number of firms with available alliance partners is much less than the firms with text-based peers provided by Hoberg 
and Philips (2010, 2014); and (2) on average, a firm is linked to 2.65 partners each year and the median number of 
partners is one, which is much less than the number of linked text-based peers.  
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The results on strategic partners also reinforce our previous argument on peer effects—that is, 
they are primarily induced by competition among peers rather than as a herding phenomenon or the 
notion that firms take actions purely because of peer pressure. In other words, if the peer effects of 
CSR adoption is purely due to herding or peer pressure without competitive factors, we would expect 
similar signs of the estimate of CARs in alliance partners and the estimate of CARs in product market 
peers. Instead, we observe higher CARs in alliance partners of a voting firm that passes a CSR 
proposal. This suggests that—on top of a ―herding‖ explanation—the adoption of CSR has positive 
value implications for alliance partners through collaboration and negative value implications for 
product market peers through competition.  
 




Despite the well-developed literature on the determinants and value consequences of CSR, little is 
known about how the CSR practice can influence or be influenced by peer firms or industry dynamics. 
In this paper, we present evidence on the peer effects of corporate social responsibility, with a focus on 
the reaction of peer firms’ stock returns and subsequent CSR strategies. Specifically, we adapt the 
regression discontinuity design approach to the analysis of event studies and apply it to the outcome of 
votes on CSR proposals in shareholder meetings. By focusing on peer firms’ reactions to the ―locally‖ 
exogenous implementation of CSR, our paper provides novel insight into the dynamics of CSR and 
whether it has strategic value.  
We find that on the days immediately before and after a shareholder meeting, a CSR proposal 
that passes by a narrow margin of votes yields a cumulative abnormal return of its non-voting peer 
firms that is -0.6% to -1% higher compared to a CSR proposal that fails marginally. In addition, the 
difference in CSR scores between passing peers and failing peers significantly increases by 0.16 points 
(30% of the standard deviation of the CSR score) on average in the year after the focal firm’s CSR 
proposal vote. These results are robust with randomly drawn peer samples and with different definition 
of peers based on SIC 3-digit industry classification. We further find that the competitive relationship 
between voting-firms and non-voting firms plays an important role in influencing the peer effects, 
which are stronger when the competitive pressure is higher and when the non-voting peer firms have a 
better CSR performance. Consistent with the competitive pressure argument, we find that peers with 
more severe financial constraints experience more negative abnormal returns and less CSR adoption 
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following the passage of the voting firm’s CSR proposal. In addition, such peer effects are stronger in 
peer firms with greater information transparency—i.e., followed by more financial analysts or have a 
larger firm size. As a whole, our analysis uncovers the dynamics of firms in product markets in regard 
to their social performance and suggests strong peer effects of CSR on peer firms’ stock returns and 
strategies.  
Our empirical results lend additional support to the competitive advantages hypothesis of CSR. 
By documenting a lower market return of firms when their peer firm passes a CSR proposal, we 
confirm that increased CSR in a firm creates competitive threats to its product market peers. By 
documenting a higher subsequent CSR performance in the passing peers compared with the failing 
peers, we show how CSR activity interacts with product market competition and that peer effects can 
promote good practice among peers. Taken together, our study echoes the literature that takes a 
positive view on CSR and considers it to be a strategically valuable tool. Our findings also have policy 
implications in that policymakers aiming at promoting corporate socially responsible behaviors could 
initiate such activities in a few firms and the competitive nature of the market would leverage the 
impact of the policy and help achieve an overall improvement in CSR on the market. Of course there 
are many other policy-relevant questions that our results cast light on, which are beyond the scope of 
this paper but worth addressing. For example, do active institutional investors and other types of 
controlling shareholders play a role in affecting the magnitudes of CSR peer effects? What are the ―net 
effects‖ on all shareholders and stakeholders in the society at large from the social welfare perspective? 
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 Distribution of Non-Voting Peers against the Percentage of CSR Votes  
This figure plots the histogram of the percentage of non-voting peer firms in our sample per each voting share 
interval (each interval represents 5% of voting shares). Our sample contains 1,407 unique CSR votes retrieved 
from the RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent databases from 1997 to 2011. We obtain non-voting peers from 
Hoberg-Phillips industry classifications based on firm pairwise similarity scores from textual analysis of firm 
10-K product descriptions. Our sample contains 38,630 unique (non-voting) peer-votes from 3,452 unique U.S. 







 Density of CSR Vote Shares 
This figure plots the density of CSR vote shares following the procedure in McCrary (2008). The x-axis is the 
distance (in percentage of votes) from the majority threshold of passing a proposal. The dots depict the density 













The Peer Effects of CSR: Regression Discontinuity Plots 
The figures present regression discontinuity plots using a fitted quadratic polynomial estimate with 95% 
confidence level. The x-axis is distance (in percentage of votes) from the majority threshold of passing a 
proposal. The dots represent the responses from non-voting peer firms. We plot the figures according to 20 
equally-spaced bins (with a bin width being 5% of vote shares), and the dashed lines represent their confidence 
intervals. Figure 3a plots the average [-1, +1] market-model CAR of non-voting peer firms in each bin. Figure 
3b plots the average adjusted KLD Score in year +1 of non-voting peer firms in each bin.  
 
Figure 3a. Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Peer Firms around the 50% Majority 
Threshold of the CSR Proposal 
 
Figure 3b. Following-Year KLD Scores of Peer Firms around the 50% Majority Threshold of 




 Sample Distribution of CSR Proposals 
This table presents the distributions of CSR proposals and of the affected non-voting peers. Panel A reports the 
sample distribution by year and Panel B reports the sample distribution by the type of CSR proposals. Our 
sample contains 1,407 unique CSR votes retrieved from the RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent databases over the 
period of 1997-2011. We obtain non-voting peers from Hoberg-Phillips industry classifications based on firm 
pairwise similarity scores from text analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions. Our sample contains 38,630 
unique (non-voting) peer-vote observations that correspond to 3,452 unique U.S. public firms.   
 
Panel A: Distribution of Events across Years 
Year # of Votes 




1997 60 690 1.79% 
1998 61 686 3.56% 
1999 50 584 5.07% 
2000 82 1,031 7.74% 
2001 82 1,015 10.37% 
2002 89 1,330 13.81% 
2003 86 2,980 21.53% 
2004 106 3,640 30.95% 
2005 108 3,712 40.56% 
2006 115 3,886 50.62% 
2007 112 3,760 60.35% 
2008 112 3,778 70.13% 
2009 122 3,860 80.12% 
2010 120 3,894 90.20% 
2011 102 3,784 100.00% 
Total 1,407 38,630 
 
    Panel B: Distribution of Events across Proposal Types 
Type # of Votes 
# of Non-Voting 
Peers 
Percentage 
Community 84 2,592 6.71% 
Corporate Governance 59 3,367 8.72% 
Diversity 185 3,586 9.28% 
Employee Relationship 204 3,765 9.75% 
Environment 431 10,809 27.98% 
Human Rights 95 2,941 7.61% 
Others (Alcohol, Military, Nuclear, Tobacco) 73 939 2.43% 
General Social Responsibility Issues 276 10,631 27.52% 





This table reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Based on the 1,407 unique CSR proposals that 
were being voted, our sample consists of 38,630 unique (non-voting) peer-vote observations from 3,452 unique 





Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Variable # of Obs Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
CAR [-1, +1] 38,630 -0.0013 0.0289 -0.0191 -0.0012 0.0170 
Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor CAR [-1, +1] 38,630 -0.0005 0.0302 -0.0185 -0.0004 0.0174 
Carhart (1997) Four-Factor CAR [-1, +1] 38,630 -0.0006 0.0298 -0.0183 -0.0005 0.0171 
Total Assets (millions US$) 38,630 7,589 11,994 715 2,273 7,941 
Market-to-Book 38,630 1.69 0.87 1.08 1.30 1.98 
Leverage 38,630 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.33 
ROA 37,634 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.15 
Adj. KLD Score 38,630 -0.13 0.42 -0.33 -0.14 0.13 
Raw KLD Score 38.630 0.04 2.59 -1.00 0.00 1.00 
Adj. KLD Strengths 38,630 0.22 0.37 0.00 0.13 0.29 
Adj. KLD Concerns 38,630 0.41 0.43 0.00 0.33 0.58 
Adj. KLD Environment Score 38,630 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj. KLD Employee Relationship Score 38,630 -0.04 0.16 -0.20 0.00 0.00 
Adj. KLD Diversity Score 38,630 -0.07 0.26 -0.33 0.00 0.13 
Adj. KLD Community Score 38,630 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Product Market Fluidity 38,067 9.38 5,45 5.57 8.41 11.87 
Adj. KLD Score Gap 38,630 -0.05 0.79 -0.49 -0.01 0.43 
Analyst Coverage 36,442 13.00 9.63 6.00 11.00 19.00 
HP Index 38,290 -3.74 0.60 -4.29 -3.65 -3.30 
Dividend Dummy 38,228 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ROE t+2 29,108 0.08 0.58 0.03 0.14 0.23 
ROS t+2 28,993 0.05 0.36 0.02 0.09 0.12 






Validity for CSR Vote as Regression Discontinuity Design (Pre-Existing Difference) 
This table shows differences in several observable characteristics—adjusted KLD score, firm size, market-to-
book ratio, leverage ratio, and ROA—between (non-voting) peer firms that are associated with a passage 
(―Pass‖) of CSR proposal in voting firms and those that are associated with a rejection (―Fail‖) of CSR proposal 
in voting firms by a small margin. We define the margin as the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012).  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Fail Pass 
Difference                    
(Fail v.s. Pass) 
Difference within  
small margin  
(optimal bandwidth) 
 
Obs. Mean Obs Mean Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Adj. KLD Score 37,685 -0.19 945 -0.18 -0.015 0.313 -0.011 0.653 
Size 37,685 7.76 945 8.16 -0.399 0.000 -0.138 0.156 
Market-to-Book 37,685 1.70 945 1.42 0.276 0.000 0.046 0.261 
Leverage 37,685 0.21 945 0.20 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.284 







Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: Baseline Results 
This table presents RDD estimations from local linear regression as specified in Equation (1) using the optimal 
bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). We report results across alternative bandwidths, 
including 50% of optimal bandwidth (narrower bandwidth), 75% of optimal bandwidth (narrower bandwidth), 
and 150% of optimal bandwidth (wider bandwidth).  Results using both the rectangular and the triangular 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Market Response of Non-Voting Peer Firms to the Passage of a Voting Firm’s CSR Proposal 
CAR 
 [-1, +1] 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 




50% of Optimal 
Bandwidth 
75% of Optimal 
Bandwidth 















t-stat -4.11 -1.70 -2.78 -4.76 -2.77 
Obs. 5,173 1,817 3,519 11,466 5,173 
Kernel Rectangular Triangular 
      
Panel B: Following-Year Strategic Response of Non-Voting Peer Firms to the Passage of a Voting Firm’s 
CSR Proposal 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 




50% of Optimal 
Bandwidth 
75% of Optimal 
Bandwidth 















t-stat 6.18 2.28 4.31 4.26 4.37 
Obs. 5,507 1,884 3,900 12,385 5,507 






Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal:  
Global Polynomial Regression Discontinuity 
This table presents RDD results from estimating a polynomial model as specified in Equation (2). The 
dependent variables are three-day [-1, +1] CARs using the market model and Adjusted KLD Score in year t+1 
of (non-voting) peers. Column (1) and (2) do not include control variables, and Column (3) and (4) include the 
following control variables: Size, Market-to-Book, Leverage, and ROA. Variable definitions are provided in 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CAR 
 [-1, +1] 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
CAR 
 [-1, +1] 
Adj. KLD Score 
t+1 
















 (0.13) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) 
     
Polynomial Order 3 3 3 3 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Obs. 38,630 37,634 







Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: Alternative Measures 
This table reports the RDD estimates using alternative measures of three-day [-1, +1] CAR (Panel A) and of 
CSR performance (Panel B). The Average CARs in Column (1) of Panel A are the portfolio average CARs of 
all associated non-voting peers of each voting firm, and are estimated using the market model. The CARs in 
Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model, 
respectively. Following-year CSR performance in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Panel B are the portfolio average 
KLD score of all associated non-voting peers of each voting firm in year [t+1], Raw KLD Score in year 
[t+1], and the change of the adjusted KLD score from year [t-1] to year [t+1]. We follow Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative Measures of CAR 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Average CAR [-1, +1] 
 Market Model 
CAR [-1, +1] 
Three-Factor 









t-stat -2.73 -4.12 -2.90 
Obs. 150 2,823 1,905 
    
Panel B: Alternative Measures of CSR Score 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Average Adj KLD Score 
 t+1 
Raw KLD Score 
 t+1 
Δ Adj KLD Score 








t-stat 2.91 6.08 3.69 






Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: Robustness 
This table presents the RDD estimates using alternative peer-firm samples. We follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear regression with the 
optimal bandwidth.  In Panel A (a), we re-define peer firms as non-voting firms in the same 3-digit SIC industries 
(104,083 non-voting firm-vote observations).  Panel A (b) and Panel A (c) show sub-period results. In Panel B, we 
arbitrarily assign a maximum number of non-voting peers for each voting firm and randomly select its peer firms 
from the pool of all its non-voting peers into the sample: maximum 30 peers for (d), maximum 40 peers for (e), and 
maximum 50 peers for (f).  In Panel C, we conduct placebo tests using a matched non-peer sample.  Specifically, 
for each peer firm, we find a matched non-peer firm based on firm size, market-to-book and leverage. In Panel D, 
we conduct placebo tests by examining the reactions of peer firms to the passage of non-CSR proposals. Variable 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: Alternative Industry Classifications and Sample Periods 
 
a. 3-digit SIC peers b. 2003-2011 c. 2005-2011 
 
Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 














t-stat -5.49 6.77 -4.73 4.90 -2.12 4.15 
Obs. 8,169 6,800 5,450 5,478 3,836 1,584 
 
Panel B: Randomly Selected Sample with Arbitrarily Assigned Numbers of Peers 
 
d. 30 peers e. 40 peers f. 50 peers 
 
Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 
[-1, +1] CAR 
Adj. KLD 
Score t+1 














t-stat -2.81 2.06 -3.40 1.96 -4.77 2.26 
Obs. 3,680 2,253 4,323 3,872 3,377 3,529 
 
Panel C: Placebo Test on Non-Peers 
 Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 [0] AR [0, +1] CAR [-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
     
Estimate 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0005 -0.03 
t-stat 1.00 0.81 -0.28 -0.98 
Obs. 2,857 5,206 11,367 5,241 
 
Panel D. Placebo Test on Non-CSR Proposals 
 Excluding corporate governance proposals Randomly selected 1,407 proposals 
 Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 [-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 [-1, +1] CAR 






t-stat -3.49 2.77 -0.95 




Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: Decomposing KLD Score 
This table presents the effects of the passage of a CSR proposal on (non-voting) peers’ following-year CSR 
performance by decomposing KLD Score into different dimensions. Panel A shows the RDD estimates for the 
adjusted KLD strengths score (column (1)) and the adjusted KLD concerns score (column (2)). Panel B shows 
the RDD estimates for three major sub-dimensional KLD scores: Environment (column (1)), Employee 
Relationship (column (2)), and Workforce Diversity (column (3)). Panels C, D and E replicate the analysis in 
Panel B on the three major sub-dimensional KLD scores, but within the subsample of environment-related 
proposals, of diversity-related proposals, and of employee relationship proposals, respectively. We follow 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Following-Year KLD Strengths Score and Concerns Score of Non-voting Peers 
 




















Panel B: Following-Year KLD Sub-Dimensional Scores of Non-voting Peers 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Adj. Environment Score Adj. Employee Relationship Score Adj. Workforce Diversity Score 







t-stat 1.74 2.05 1.75 
Obs. 3,000 3,865 2,644 
Panel C: Environment-Related Proposals and Non-voting Peers’ Following-Year KLD Sub-Scores 
 Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Adj. Environment Score Adj. Employee Relationship Score Adj. Workforce Diversity Score 





t-stat 2.92 0.65 1.84 
Obs. 1,233 1,233 1,966 
Panel D: Diversity-Related Proposals and Non-voting Peers’ Following-Year KLD Sub-Scores 
 Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Adj. Environment Score Adj. Employee Relationship Score Adj. Workforce Diversity Score 





t-stat -1.37 2.98 6.32 
Obs. 723 141 136 
Panel E: Employee Relationship Proposals and Non-voting Peers’ Following-Year KLD Sub-Scores 
 Pass v.s. Fail 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Adj. Environment Score Adj. Employee Relationship Score Adj. Workforce Diversity Score 
    Estimate -0.06 0.36
***
 0.00 
t-stat -0.94 3.47 0.01 




Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal:  
The Role of Competitive Relation 
This table reports the RDD estimates on subsamples partitioned by the ―competitive threats‖ between the 
voting- and non-voting firms in the year before the CSR vote (Panel A), and by the relative CSR performance, 
i.e., the difference in adjusted KLD score between the (non-voting) peer and the voting firm (Panel B). 
―Competitive threats‖ is proxied by the voting firm’s Fluidity, which measures the similarity between the 
change in a firm’s product space and the aggregate change in the competitors’ product description. When 
Fluidity is greater, the firm’s products are more similar to its peers’ and thus the competitive threat is greater. In 
Panel A, a High Fluidity group is defined as peer firms whose associated voting-firm’s Fluidity score is above 
the median of the whole voting-firm sample, and a Low Fluidity group is defined as peer firms whose associated 
voting-firm’s Fluidity score is below the median of the whole voting-firm sample. We follow Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Competitive Threats (voting firm’s fluidity) 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High Low High Low 






t-stat -5.48 -0.60 2.02 0.84 
Obs. 1,240 1,310 1,882 2,770 
     
Panel B: Relative KLD Score in Year t-1 (peer firm minus voting firm) 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
>=0 <0 >=0 <0 






t-stat -4.17 -1.10 2.76 -0.20 






Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal: 
 The Role of Financial Constraints 
This table presents the RDD estimates on subsamples partitioned by the level of a firm’s financial constraints. 
Panel A partitions the non-voting peer firms into two subgroups according to their Hadlock-Pierce (HP) Index in 
year t-1. Specifically, for each vote, we define a High HP-Index group as non-voting peers whose HP-Index 
scores are higher than the median of the whole non-voting peers sample, and Low HP-Index group as non-
voting peers whose HP-Index scores are lower than the sample median. Panel B partitions the non-voting peer 
firms into two subgroups according to whether the firm distributed dividends in year t-1. We follow Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear 







significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Hadlock-Pierce Index 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High Low High Low 








t-stat -2.94 -0.98 2.30 4.76 
Obs. 1,420 1,344 2,583 2,930 
     
     
Panel B: Dividend Payment in  Year t-1 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No Yes No Yes 
     
Estimate -0.0102
***
 -0.00003 0.04 0.15
***
 
t-stat -2.83 -0.01 0.92 3.51 
Obs. 1,631 2,709 2,104 2,709 





Responses of Non-Voting Peers to the Passage of a CSR Proposal:  
The Role of Corporate Information Environment 
This table presents the RDD estimates on subsamples partitioned by the level of a firm’s information 
transparency. Panel A partitions the non-voting peer firms into two subgroups according to the number of 
unique financial analysts following (―Analyst Coverage‖) in year t-1. For each vote, a High Analyst Coverage 
group is defined as non-voting peers whose numbers of analyst following are above the median of the whole 
non-voting peers sample, and Low Analyst Coverage group is defined as non-voting peers with the number of 
analyst following that is below the sample median. Panel B partitions the non-voting peer firms into two 
subgroups according to their firm size in year t-1. For each vote, Large Firm Size group is defined as non-voting 
peers whose firm sizes (total assets) are above the median of the whole non-voting peers sample, and Small 
Firm Size Group is defined as non-voting peers whose firm sizes are below the sample median. We follow 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using 






 denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyst Coverage 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
High Low High Low 








t-stat -3.84 -0.99 4.56 3.06 
Obs. 1,449 1,316 1,520 1,643 
     
     
Panel B: Firm Size 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
[-1, +1] CAR Adj. KLD Score t+1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Large Small Large Small 








t-stat -4.09 -1.18 3.36 3.21 
Obs. 1,298 1,443 1,748 1,230 







Long-Run Effects of the Passage of a CSR Proposal on Non-Voting Peers 
This table presents the RDD estimates of peer firms’ long-run operating performance two years after their 
affiliated voting firm passed the close-call CSR proposal. We follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and 
estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR proposal using local linear regression with the optimal 
bandwidth.  Panel A reports the baseline RDD estimates on three operating performance measures: return on 
equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), and sales growth rate. Panel B reports the RDD estimates of these three 
performance measures on subsamples partitioned by the level of a firm’s financial constraints using the 






 denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Pass v.s. Fail 
 
(1) (2) (3) 








t-stat 1.72 2.23 2.52 
Obs. 2,767 2,459 2,321 
 
Panel B: Partitioned by Financial Constraints 
  Pass v.s. Fail Pass v.s. Fail 
 
High Hadlock-Pierce Index Low Hadlock-Pierce Index 
 
ROE t+2 ROS t+2 
Sales 
Growth t+2 
ROE t+2 ROS t+2 
Sales 
Growth t+2 







t-stat 1.23 -0.5 0.97 1.99 2.82 2.77 






The Response of Non-Voting Strategic Alliance Partners to the Passage of a CSR Proposal 
This table presents the RDD estimates for non-voting alliance partners’ CAR and CSR performance. We 
consider a firm as a non-voting partner if it is in a valid strategic alliance with the voting-firm on the voting day. 
We follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and estimate the effects of the passage of a close-call CSR 
proposal using local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth. We obtain strategic alliance announcement 
dates and partners information from SDC platinum. Our alliance partner sample contains 9,148 (non-voting) 
partner-vote observations from 1,392 unique U.S. public firms over 1997-2011. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix B. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Pass v.s. Fail 
 
CAR Adj KLD Score ΔAdj KLD Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 [0] [0,+1] [-1,+1] t+1 t-1 to t+1 












t-stat 1.93 1.82 1.81 2.19 1.76 
Obs. 760 460 242 217 209 





Appendix A: Examples of Close-Call CSR Proposals and Peer Firms’ Reaction 
 
Panel A: 
Example of a Marginally Rejected CSR Proposal 
 
Panel B: 
Example of a Marginally Approved CSR Proposal 
Company 
Name: 





The Company produces, processes and sells 
bituminous coal of various steam and 
metallurgical grades, primarily of a low sulfur 
content, through its 25 processing and shipping 
centers (Resource Groups), many of which 
receive coal from multiple mines. 
 
The Company’s principal operating subsidiary is 
Idaho Power Company, an electric utility engaged 
in the generation, transmission, distribution, sale, 
and purchase of electric energy. Its other 
subsidiaries include IDACORP Financial 
Services, and Ida-West Energy Company, etc.  
Stock Ticker: NYSE: MEE  NYSE: IDA 
Date of Vote: 19-May-2009 
 
21-May-2009 




Shareholders request a special report to be 
reviewed by a board committee of independent 
directors on how the Company is responding to 
the rising regulatory and public pressure to 
significantly reduce the social and environmental 
harm associated with carbon dioxide emissions 
from the Company’s operations and from the use 
of its primary products. The report should be 
provided by November 1, 2009 at a reasonable 





Shareholders request that the Board of Directors 
adopt quantitative goals—based on current 
technologies—of reducing total greenhouse gas 
emissions from the Company’s products and 
operations; and that the Company report to 
shareholders by September 30, 2009, on its plans 
to achieve these goals.  Such a report will omit 
proprietary information and be prepared at 
reasonable cost. 
Voting Results: Rejected (45.6% of the votes) 
 
Passed (51.2% of the votes) 
    
 Non-Voting Peer Firms’ Reaction  Non-Voting Peer Firms’ Reaction 
All Peers 




CSR Score in 
year t+1  




CSR Score in 
year t+1  
49 0.0137 -0.62  55 -0.0068 -0.20 
One Randomly 
Selected  Peer 
Peer Name 3-day CAR 
Adj. CSR Score 
in year t+1  
 Peer Name 3-day CAR 
Adj. CSR Score 
in year t+1  








Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Source 
Firm Size The logarithm of total assets (item 6) of a firm. Compustat 
 
Market-to-Book 
Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item 6 (total assets)− item 60 (common 
equity) + item 25 (common share outstanding) × item 199 (fiscal year-end stock 
price))/item 6 (total assets). 
Compustat 
Leverage Book leverage: All debt (item 9 (long-term debt) + item 34 (short-term debt)/Total assets 
(item 6). 
Compustat 
ROA ROA is calculated as (item 13 (operating income before depreciation)/item 6 (total 
assets)). 
Compustat 
Adj. KLD Score The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and 
environmental record KLD CSR Scores. Adjusted CSR is estimated by scaling the raw 
strength and concern scores of each category by the number of items of strength and 
concerns of that category in the year and then taking the net difference between adjusted 





The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and 





The sum of yearly adjusted community activities, diversity, employee relations, and 





Adjusted environmental record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw 
environmental strength and concerns scores by the number of items of environmental 
strengths and concerns in the year and then taking the net difference between adjusted 






Adjusted employee relationship record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the 
raw employee strength and concerns scores by the number of items of employee strengths 






Adjusted diversity record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw 
diversity strength and concerns scores by the number of items of diversity strengths and 






Adjusted community record KLD STATS CSR Score, calculated by scaling the raw 
community strength and concerns scores by the number of items of community strengths 




Fluidity Fluidity is a ―cosine‖ similarity between a firm’s products and changes in the peers’ 
products and scaled between 0 and 1.  Larger fluidity indicates greater product market 












Hadlock and Pierce (2010) financial constraint index, with higher value indicating more 
financial constraint. 
                                  
               
Compustat 
 Dividend Payment An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a non-zero dividend (Data21) this 
year and zero otherwise. 
Compustat 
Analyst Coverage Number of unique analysts following the company each year I/B/E/S 
ROE t+2 Return on equity, calculated as (item 13 (operating income before depreciation)/item 60 
(common equity)). 
Compustat 
ROS t+2 Return on sales, calculated as (item 13 (operating income before depreciation)/ item 12 
(sales)). 
Compustat 
Sales Growth t+2 Sales growth rate, change in item 12 (sales) scaled by lagged item 12 (sales). Compustat 
 
